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Development of Subsidiary Sow-Farrowing Firms
in Iowa1
by Arnold Paulsen and Michael Rahm2
The pork industry has been modified by a series of 
innovations in production technologies and now may 
be modified by changes in the organizational form of 
ownership. Changes in technology have resulted in a 
movement of pork production from an uncontrolled to 
a controlled environment. Confinement structures 
are rapidly being adopted to house much of Iowa’s 
livestock, especially hogs.
Not as physically obvious but perhaps also impor­
tant is a new organizational form in pork production 
— the subsidiary sow-farrowing firm that is collec­
tively owned. Since 1970, several hundred indepen­
dent Iowa farm operators, agribusinessmen, and 
other interested individuals have formed more than 
80 new firms. Each group of 2 to 22 members con­
structs a farrowing center, purchases breeding stock, 
and hires a full-time specialist to operate the facility 
and manage the sow herd. Each firm produces from 
4,000 to 15,000 40-pound pigs. The pigs usually are 
sold to the organization shareholders at a price equal 
to the cost of production and finished on shareholders’ 
farms. In a few instances, the feeder pigs are fed to 
butcher weight and marketed by the collective or­
ganization.
The firm is analogous to a factory with specialized 
production processes and corporate form of 
ownership. Large numbers and confinement tech­
nology enable the manager to establish routine pro­
duction procedures similar to modern manufacturing 
processes. Ownership is vested in individuals dif­
ferent from those who do the management and labor. 
Owners provide capital, make policy, and invest in 
facilities, breeding stock, and equipment but make no 
day-to-day decisions. They take risk, accept profit or 
loss, and hire the manager, who, in turn, hires the re­
quired labor. Labor and management receive a 
guaranteed income while the owners accept any 
variation in prices, efficiency, and profit. Because 
owners usually are area farmers who purchase the 
feeder pigs to finish on their own farm, the factory is a 
subsidiary of several independent finishing firms. In 
this report, such a "pig manufacturing” unit will be 
called a subsidiary sow-farrowing firm.
This report analyzes only large, confinement sow- 
farrowing units that are collectively owned. To be in­
cluded in this study the subsidiary sow-farrowing 
firm 1) had to be collectively owned by a group of two 
or more unrelated individuals, 2) had to consist of a
Project 2209 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experi­
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centralized farrowing facility with a capacity of at 
least 350 sows, and 3) had to be operated by a full­
time manager.
A regular corporation, a subchapter S corporation, 
or a cooperative all qualified as a legal form of "collec­
tively owned entity.” Association or cooperative 
marketing is common in U. S. agriculture, but a col­
lectively owned production unit such as the sub­
sidiary sow-farrowing firm is relatively rare.
This study does not treat family corporations with 
pork operations even if such firms overall were large, 
confinement sow-farowing facilities and had legally 
organized as a corporation. To be included in the sam­
ple, at least one member of the sow-farrowing firm 
had to be unrelated to other members of the firm. This 
criterion excluded several large, family-farm pork 
operations. The typical family operation is actually 
multiproduct in nature, and the separation between 
ownership, management, and labor is seldom distinct 
even though one family member may specialize in 
hog production.
The minimum capacity to qualify as a "cen­
tralized” farrowing facility in this study was set at 
350 sows. This is approximately the minimum-scale 
requirement to justify a full-time manager. Finally, 
the full-time manager had to be directly responsible 
for the operation of the facility and have no other oc­
cupation.
With these criteria, 88 collectively owned sow- 
farrowing firms were identified in Iowa in early 1977. 
The list of qualified firms was accumulated by contac­
ting area livestock extension specialists and county 
extension directors in Iowa. A survey was conducted 
in 1977 with two questionnaires, one for the board 
chairman and one for the manager. These were 
mailed to the board chairmen of all firms identified in 
Iowa. After two mail contacts, only 27 (31%) firms had 
completed questionnaires and returned them by mail. 
The remaining 61 board chairmen and managers who 
did not respond by mail were then contacted personal­
ly by interviewers. When the questionnaires were 
taken to the board chairmen and managers by Iowa 
State University interviewers, 38 of the 61 firms that 
did not respond by mail completed the interviews, but 
23 of the 88 firms still refused to participate. Thus, of 
the 88 specialized sow-farrowing firms collectively 
owned in Iowa in the summer of 1977, 65 (73%) 
participated in the survey.
It seems to the authors by follow-up from secon­
dary sources such as extension specialists and other 
board chairmen that the nonrespondents were ran­
domly distributed among size, geographical location, 
and efficiency classes. It seems probable that this
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summary of a 73% sample represents the population 
in an unbiased manner on most characteristics.
The objective of this report is to describe the or­
ganizational, production, and managerial charac­
teristics of the Iowa firms. The subsidiary sow- 
farrowing firm is a relatively recent development. 
Some characteristics important in explaining success, 
such as the manager’s incentive plan, features of 
building design, and summer sow conception rates, 
were not evident to us until after the survey was 
taken. We believe the information reported about 
subsidiary sow-farrowing firms in Iowa will be 
helpful to those interested in this form of organiza­
tion. We know that data with respect to several pro­
duction variables are limited.
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Date of organization and legal structure
The first sow-farrowing firm was organized and 
began production in 1970, but about 90% of the cur­
rent firms were not organized until 1973 or after and 
did not begin production until after 1974. Thus, the 
sow-farrowing firm has become a significant compo­
nent of Iowa pork production only in the last 4 years, 
from 1974 through 1977. The firm was organized 
typically about 1 year before the date the first feeder- 
pig was produced. The date of organization was 
specified either as the month and year when articles 
of incorporation were formed or as the month and 
year when equity capital was collected from the mem­
bers and a loan was secured in the name of the or­
ganization. The date of first production was the 
month and year when the first pigs were born.
The average lag between the date of organization 
and the date of first production was 11 months. The 
length of this lag was as long as 2 years and as short 
as 6 months. Evidently, some boards were very de­
cisive and quickly completed the construction, 
equipped the facility, and purchased bred sows timed 
to farrow shortly after completion of construction. 
Others took much more time to get into production. 
The number of firms organized each year and the 
number of firms beginning production each year are 
presented in Table 1.
Table 1. The Distribution of Firms by Year of Organization and Year 
of Initial Production.
Year
Number of firms 
organized
Number of firms that 
began production
1970 -1 i
1971 i 0
1972 3 1
1973 19 5
1974 18 18
1975 7 17
1976 , 1 5 7
1977 1 16
TOTAL 65 65
Of the 65 firms surveyed, 54 (83%) were organized 
as subchapter S corporations. Nine firms were or­
ganized as regular corporations. The basic require­
ments for a subchapter S corporation, which can elect 
to be taxed as a partnership, are: 1) the corporation 
must have 10 or fewer shareholders; 2) all 
shareholders must be individuals, estates, grantor 
trusts, or voting trust; 3) no nonresident alien may be 
a shareholder, 4) the corporation may issue only one 
class of stock; and 5) no more than 20% of gross re­
ceipts may be from certain passive types of income 
such as renting land. The legal structure of the 65 
Iowa firms responding to the survey is presented in 
Table 2.
Table 2. The Distribution of Firms by Legal Structure
Legal structure Number of firms
Regular corporation 9
Subchapter S corporation 54
Cooperative 1
Partnership 1
TOTAL 65
Incentives for organization
These collective organizations didn’t just happen, 
they usually were created by an easily identifiable in­
dividual. The individual who created the interest and 
recruited potential members remained an important 
individual in the firm and usually was the first board 
chairman. In most sow-farrowing firms, one person 
was readily recognized by all members as responsible 
for organizing the firm Feed salesmen and farmers 
were primarily responsible for the organization of the 
firms in Iowa. Of the 65 firms surveyed, 20 were or­
ganized by a feed salesman, 18 were organized by a 
farmer or a group of farmers, and 18 were organized 
by a combination of all possible sources listed. Only 
one firm listed a breeding stock dealer or an equip­
ment supplier as the organizer. The distribution of 
firms by source responsible for organization is pre­
sented in Table 3.
Collective swine production is not traditional in 
Iowa. Therefore we expect that strong incentives 
must have motivated individuals to form sow- 
farrowing firms. Each board chairman was asked to 
list and rank the three most important incentives 
among the members of his corporation for joining the 
group at the time of organization. Other incentives 
present among the members, but not ranked in the 
top three, also were requested. The most important 
incentives varied among individual members and 
among firms; hence, to aggregate important incen­
tives across firms and find the most important for the 
creation of these firms in Iowa we had to weight each 
incentive by its rank of importance in the firm. Four 
points were given each reason ranked one, three
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Table 3. The Distribution of Firms by Occupation of Individual 
Responsible for Organization
Occupation of organizer Number of firms
Farmer 18
Breeding stock dealer 1
Equipment supplier \
Feed salesman 20
Veterinarian 2
Banker 2
Agribusinessman (excluding feed salesmen) 3
Some combination of the above 18
TOTAL 65
points if ranked two, two points for three, and one 
point for a reason checked as important but not 
ranked. Table 4 summarizes the results from this 
ranking and weighting scheme.
The most important incentive for organization 
was to provide shareholders with "a reliable source of 
quality feeder pigs at a price equal to the cost of pro­
duction.” Three subincentives actually were involved 
in this dominant motivation for members to form a 
sow-farrowing firm— reliability, quality, and cost. 
This incentive was ranked first by 40 of the 65 firms.
The second most important incentive for organiz­
ing the firm was to save the time spent with the in­
tensive activity of farrowing pigs. Many of the mem­
bers evidently thought they had a higher-valued use 
for this labor in grain production or more capital in­
tensive livestock activities. Some just may have 
wanted to work fewer total hours.
The third most important incentive was related to 
specialization. Not only did members want to 
eliminate from their own schedule the sensitive job of 
farrowing, but they also wanted to place the task in 
the hands of a person who had proper training and in-
Table 4. The number of Firms Ranking or Checking Each Incentive for 
Organization
Incentive for 
organization (4
1
points)
2
(3 points)
Rank
3
(2 points)
Checked
(1) Total-
1» Reliable source of 
quality pigs at 
cost of production 40 ii 3 4 203
2. Released labor from 
farrowing activities 7 28 11 6 140
3. Farrowing is done by 
a fullrtimg specialist 8 14 24 5 127
4. Means to accumulate 
required capital 3 1 9 12 45
5. Provided an attrac­
tive tax shelter 1 3 3 15 34
6. Transferrable shares 
provided ownership 
flexibility 0 2 4 9 23
7. Agricultural invest­
ment for nonagricul- 
tural interests 1 0 1 3 9
8. Other 2 2 0 2 16
, , total for each incentive is the points for each rank multiplied
y the number of firms assign.ing that rank.
terest and who could devote all his time and attention 
to farrowing sows.
Although 25 board chairmen acknowledged that 
the collective ownership of the sow-farrowing firm 
made it easier to accumulate the required amount of 
equity capital and borrowing potential, this was 
seldom ranked first. By the weighting scheme, the in­
centive to accumulate capital was less than about 
one-third as important as each of the first three 
reasons. Board chairmen also acknowledged that the 
firm provided an attractive tax shelter, but it 
evidently was a relatively unimportant incentive for 
organization. Nevertheless, many board chairmen 
thought that this may have been an important incen­
tive for one or two members of the organization. 
Several other factors were mentioned by one or two 
firms, but played relatively minor roles in the de­
velopment of the sow-farrowing firm movement in 
Iowa.
The number of members in each firm ranged from 
2 to 22, with a mean of 8.6 members per firm. Of the 
65 firms surveyed, 41 (63%) have from 8 to 10 mem­
bers. Since subchapter S classification restricts the 
number of members to 10 or fewer, the distribution of 
firms is not balanced about the average of 8.6 mem­
bers per firm. A distribution of firms by ranges of the 
number of members is presented in Table 5.
Table 5. The Distribution of the Firms by Number of Members per 
Firm.
Number of members per firm Number of firms
Less than 5 4
5-7 16
8-10 41
Greater than 10 4
Occupational characteristics of members
There were 562 members in the 65 firms surveyed. 
As expected, farmers constituted 86% and nonfarmers 
14% of all owners of sow-farrowing firms. Of the 562 
total members, 483 (86%) were farmers. Feed 
salesmen were second most numerous with 36 (or 6%) 
of the 562 total members. Feed salesmen were 
relatively prominent in organizing sow-farrowing 
firms, but usually only one feed salesman was in each 
firm. A listing of members by occupation is presented 
in Table 6.
The corporate form of organization provides a 
facility for entry and exit of individual members 
without liquidation of the operation. Also a corpora­
tion affords a relatively easy method of changing the 
total number of owners. There were 562 current mem­
bers in the 65 firms surveyed, but board chairmen re­
vealed that these firms originally had 582 members. 
Of the sow-farrowing firms’ original members, 552 
(95%) still were members of the firms. Thus, 30 mem­
bers have left sow-farrowing firms, and 10 new in­
dividuals have joined firms after the organization
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Table 6. The Distribution of Members by Occupation
Occupation Number of members Percent of total
Farmers 483 86
Feed salesmen 36 6.4
Agribusiness
(excluding feed salesmen) 12 2.1
Ve ter inar ians 8 1.4
Medical doctors 4 0.7
Bankers 3 0.5
Building contractors 3 0.5 ,
Lawyers 2 0.4 .
Other 11 2.0
TOTAL 562 100.0
was established. From this preliminary information, 
it seems that the sow-farrowing firms have ownership 
stability, but with somewhat more tendency to reduce 
the total number of members than to add or replace 
members. Most firms, however, have been established 
less than 4 total years, and thus relatively few mem­
bership changes due to retirement or change of oc­
cupation would be expected.
PRODUCTION AND MARKETING 
CHARACTERISTICS
Firm size
The size of firms surveyed, measured in terms of 
sow capacity of the facility, ranged from 350 to 1000, 
with an average capacity of 544. Of the 65 firms sur­
veyed, 41 had capacities between 350 and 500. It 
seems that capacities of around 400, 500, and 700 are 
typical. The number of firms by capacity class is pre­
sented in Table 7. The number of firms by capacity of 
building and by year of organization is presented in 
Table 8.
Capital investment
Total capital investment per sow-farrowing firm 
ranged widely from $187,000 to $1,010,000 with an 
average total investment of $487,000. Average in­
vestment per firm contains five components. The 
largest investment item of $291,000, or 60% of total, 
is for building and equipment. Land at $23,000 is a 
minor input, 5% of total investment. Average invest­
ment per firm and percentage of total in buildings 
and equipment; breeding stock; operating capital; 
land; land leveling, lagoon, and well drilling are pre­
sented in Table 9.
Several components of capital investment per 
sow-farrowing firm— buildings, equipment, and 
breeding stock— have increased in cost substantially 
from 1973 to 1976. Capital investment also is nearly 
proportional with the capacity of the firm. Thus, the 
capital investment is analyzed for firms by year of or-
Table 7. The Distribution of Firms by Rated Capacity of 
Building
Sow Capacity Number of firms
350-450 23
451-550 18
551-650 5
651-750 14
> 751 5
TOTAL 65
Table 8. The Distribution of 
Capacity.
Firms by Year of Organization and by
Year 350—450
Sows
451-550 551-650 651-750 > 751
Yearly
totals
1973 10 2 2 4 1 19
1974 7 4 1 4 2 18
1975 3 2 0 1 1 7
1976 2 9 0 3 1 15
Capacity
totals 22 17 ,3 12 5 59
Table 9. The Average 
Iowa.
Capital Investment of All Sow-Farrowing Firms in
Item Average investment Percent of total
Building and equipment $291,000 60
Breeding stock 88,000 18
Operating capital 70,000 14
Land 23,000 5
Land leveling, lagoon 
well
and
15,000 3
TOTAL $487,000 100
ganization and by capacity intervals to provide a 
more detailed description of capital outlays.
Because only five firms were organized before 
1973 and only one reported organizing in 1977, only 
the years 1973 through 1976 are considered in the in­
vestment analysis by year of organization. The 
average amount invested in a sow-farrowing firm has 
increased 49% (from $419,000 to $625,000) since 1973. 
The amount invested in facilities has increased 60%, 
and the amount invested in breeding stock has in­
creased 21% since 1973. These changes, however, do 
not accurately reflect the year-to-year changes in 
prices of facilities and breeding stock. To more ac­
curately identify the source of cost increases, the 
average investment per firm must be adjusted for the 
capacity of the facility. Yearly increases in the capital 
investment per unit of sow capacity give the most ac­
curate estimates of changes in per-unit prices of con­
struction and breeding stock. Average total invest­
ment by year of organization is presented in Table 10, 
and average investment per sow by year of organiza­
tion is presented in Table 11.
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Table 10 . Original 
tion.
Capital Investment per Firm by Year of Organiza-
Avg. Bldgs. & Breeding
Year Firms Total Equip. Stock Other
Unit No. $ $ $ $
1973 17 419,000 248,000 81,000 90,000
1974 16 472,000 295,000 97,000 80,000
1975 5 527,000 303,000 86,000 138,000
1976 15 625,000 397,000 98,000 130,000
Increase 
1973 to :1976 49% 60% 44%
Table 11 . Original Capital Investment Per- 
of the Firm.
•Sow by Year of Organization
Year Firms
Avg.
Total
Bldgs. & 
Equip.
Breeding
Stock Other
No. $ $ $ . $
1973 17 795 471 158 166
1974 16 855 533 175 147
1975 5 1094 628 181 285
1976 15 1176 741 186 249
Increase 
1973 to 1976 48% 57% 50%
Total original investment made to begin a sow- 
farrowing firm increased about 50% from 1973 to 
1976. Average investment per firm increased from 
$419,000 to $625,000, and average investment per 
sow increased from $795 to $1176 from 1973 to 1976. 
All items of cost increased, but cost for buildings and 
equipment increased 57% per sow while breeding 
stock costs increased only 18% per sow. These 
estimates reflect only average increases in building 
and breeding stock costs as experienced by members 
organizing sow-farrowing firms and do not correct for 
any improvements in quality of facilities or quality of 
breeding stock over time. The 15 firms organized in 
1976 averaged 531 sows in capacity, only slightly 
larger than the average capacity of 527 for the 17 
firms organized in 1973.
Capital investment per firm also varied by capaci­
ty intervals. Total investment, investment in build­
ings and equipment, and investment in breeding 
stock per firm for five capacity classes are presented 
in Table 12. The average investment per sow for firms
Table 12. Capital Investment per Firm by 
justed to 1974 Prices ).
Capacity Class (Costs Ad-
Capacity Firms Total
Bldgs. & 
equip.
Breeding 
stock
350-450 21 382,000 230,000 73,000
451-550 16 457,000 273,000 94,000
551-650 5 598,000 344,000 86,000
651-750 14 537,000 331,000 92,000
> 751 3 658,000 431,000 139,000
All 59 487,000 291,000 88,000
by capacity classes is presented in Table 13. To in­
crease comparability, investment costs for firms or­
ganized in 1973,1975, or 1976 were adjusted to 1974 
prices. The adjustment factor was average per-sow 
cost in 1974 divided by cost in year organized.
Table 13. Capital
Adjusted
Investment Per Sow by Capacity 
to 1974 Prices).
Class (Costs
Capacity
No. of 
firms
Total 
invest.
Bldgs. & 
equip.
Breeding
stock Other
350-450 21 894 537 173 184
451-550 16 990 598 199 193
551-650 5 919 522 135 262
651-750 14 784 484 134 166
> 751 3 753 494 155 104
The smaller average investment per sow for the 
larger capacity classes indicates some economies of 
scale. Facilities for about 700 sows seem to be more ef­
ficient than smaller-sized facilities. Total investment, 
buildings and equipment, breeding stock, and "other” 
investment all decreased with increases in capacity 
from about 500 to 700 sows. Perhaps some items like 
manager’s house, office, and well are not increased 
proportionately with size. Large and small facilities 
may differ with respect to confinement technology. If 
technology changes with size, decrease in the invest­
ment per sow as size of firm increases may be the re­
sult of both change in technology and economies of 
scale. Relatively large facilities not only may have 
lower per-sow investments in buildings and equip­
ment, but also may have more or less facilities per 
sow built into the design (e.g., stalls automation, 
mechanization, and environmental control). Detailed 
observations on building design were not made.
The amount invested in breeding stock also seems 
to decrease with size. This is not very logical. We 
would expect breeding stock to vary more by years 
and also according to quality and original weight of 
gilts purchased than by capacity. Generally, mature 
or pregnant gilts mean more investment in breeding 
stock, but less time and operating cost before the first 
pigs are sold. It is probable that the seeming 
economies of scale in breeding stock are due to other 
factors.
Labor inputs
The board chairmen estimated the number of 
weeks worked and the number of hours per week 
worked for each employee of the firm. The total 
amount of labor used in the firm was measured in 
man-hours per year. Total man-hours per firm was 
calculated by multiplying the number of weeks 
worked by each employee by the average number of 
hours worked per week and summing the hours for all 
employees. The estimate of man-hours per sow- 
farrowing firm ranged from 2932 to 16,640, with an 
average of 7280 man-hours per year per firm. The 
number of firms by estimated man-hours per firm is 
presented in Table 14.
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Table 14. The Distribution of Firms by the Number of Man-Hours 
Employed in 1976.
Number of man-hours 
per year
Number of 
firms
2000 - 4000 2
4001 - 6000 12
6001 - 8000 24
8001 - 10,000 8
10,001 - 12,000 6
more than 12,000 1
Obviously one would expect the small firms to 
have fewer man-hours employed per firm. But will 
man-hours vary directly and closely with capacity? 
The number of man-hours employed per sow indicates 
considerable variation in labor efficiency or work re­
quirements per sow among the firms. For those firms 
in full production during 1976, the number of man­
hours employed per sow ranged from 6.52 to 27.18, 
with the average labor use among the 38 firms 
estimated at 14.28 man-hours per sow per year. The 
distribution of firms by number of man-hours per sow 
annually is presented in Table 15.
Another indicator of labor or employees required 
by sow-farrowing firms is the number of sows per full­
time employee. Several specialists use a "rule of 
thumb” of 200 sows for each full-time employee. If so, 
and using the average labor efficiency in the survey, 
each full-time equivalent employee must work 2856 
hours (55 hours per week). To devote 14.28 hours per 
year to each of 200 sows requires 2856 hours of work 
per year. This rule of thumb conforms closely to the 
staffing practices of the firms reporting results from 
the survey. There is some variation in labor efficiency 
among facilities, but many sow-farrowing firm 
employees are working more than 40 hours per week.
The average sow-farrowing firm in 1976 main­
tained a 534-sow herd, weaned an average of 8.34 pigs 
per litter, and produced about 8000 feeder pigs at a 
cost of $27.55 per pig, not including a charge for in­
terest and debt retirement. In 1976, 1.82 litters and 
15.18 pigs were produced per sow annually. The 
average price charged members was $35.70 per pig. A 
positive difference between price charged to members 
and production cost per pig was needed to provide for 
debt retirement.
Table 15. The Distribution of Firms by Number of Man-Hours per Sow 
per Year Analyzed in 1976.
Man hours per sow Number of firms
< 10 4
10 - 13 13
13 - 16 11
16 - 19 6
19 - 22 0
over 22 4
TOTAL 38
Reproduction efficiency
Production statistics collected include the average 
number of sows in the herd, the average weaned litter 
size, the total number of pigs produced, the cost of pro­
duction per pig, and the price charged members for 
40-pound pigs. These data were collected for each full 
year each firm had been in production. Debt repay­
ment schedules were of great interest to members but 
differed widely. The variable cost of production, cost 
per pig, should not, in principle, include either debt 
retirement or interest charges. Some firms included 
high principle and interest payments as parts of costs 
used to determine charges per pig. The cost of produc­
tion listed here is less than total. The number of pigs 
produced per sow per year was supposed to be varia­
ble costs only and calculated by dividing the total 
number of pigs produced by the average number of 
sows in the herd. The number of pigs produced per 
sow annually is the most comprehensive measure of 
reproduction efficiency. The number of litters pro­
duced per sow annually was calculated by dividing 
the number of pigs produced per sow by weaned litter 
size. Average values for all the firms and the 
minimum and maximum value for each statistic for 
the 1976 production year are presented in Table 16. 
Of the 65 firms surveyed, only 47 had completed at 
least one full year of production; i.e., had been in pro­
duction during 1976. Some firms in production in 
1976 did not report or have in an available form data 
on all production variables requested.
Table 16. 1976 Production Statistics.
Statistic
No. of 
firms
1976
average
Minimum
value
Maximum
value
Number of sows in herd 43 534 300 950
Weaned litter size 41 8.34 6.0 10.0
Number of pigs produced 39 8089 4800 15375
Per pig cost of production 38 $27.55 $16.00 $37.30
Price to members 38 $35.70 $27.00 $45.00
Litters per sow per year 38 1.82 1.40 2.30
Pigs per sow per year 39 15.18 11.52 21.60
Biological reproductive capacity increases as 
young gilts mature. Also, management probably 
learns from experience. The production efficiency 
statistics can be presented by first and second year of 
production. See Tables 17 and 18. It is possible to ob­
serve progress on average in technical and economic 
performance of sow-farrowing firms from the first to 
the second year. Of the 65 firms surveyed, 47 had com­
pleted at least one full year of production, and 38 had 
completed at least two full years of production. Only 
15 firms had completed three full years of production. 
All "first” sequential production years do not of 
course correspond to the same calendar year for all 
firms. Therefore some factors in fluencing 
performance, such as disease conditions and cost of 
feed inputs associated with a particular calendar 
year, contribute to the variation among firms in the 
first or second year of performance. Even though
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Table 17. Production Statistics for Firms1 First Production Year. Table 18. Production Statistics for Firms1 Second Production Year.
Statistic
No. of 
firms
Average for 
first pro­
duction year
Minimum
value
Maximum
value
Number of sows in herd 40 520 330 1 0 0 0
Weaned litter size 38 8.07 5.0 9 .9
Number of pigs produced 36 7352 3375 16500
Per pig cost of production 35 $27.95 $16.00 $53.00
Price to members 37 $36.69 $16.20 $50.00
Litters per sow per year 36 1.76 1.01 2.27
Pigs, per sow per year 36 14.18 8.03 20.46
Statistic
No. of 
firms
Average for 
second pro­
duction year
Minimum
value
Maximum
value
Number of sows in herd 3 3 5 3 7 330 950
Weaned litter size 31 8 . 2 1 4.5 10.0
Number of pigs produced 29 8023 3500 15,375
Per pig cost of production 28 $26.78 $16.00 $40.00
Price to members 29 $40.99 $23.40 $45.00
Litters per sow per year 28 1.87 1.49 2.30
Pigs per sow per year 28 15.31 10.00 22.42
there is wide variation, improvements in all average 
production statistics are uniformly indicated from the 
first to the second production year.
On average, both technical and economic 
performance improved from the first to second pro­
duction year. The average weaned litter size in­
creased from 8.07 to 8.21, the number of litters pro­
duced per sow annually increased from 1.76 to 1.87, 
the number of pigs produced per sow annually in­
creased from 14.18 to 15.31, and the per-pig cost of 
production decreased from $27.95 to $26.78 from the 
first to second production year. The most critical and 
comprehensive measure of technical performance is 
"pigs produced per sow annually.” In this case the 
minimum, maximum, and average all increased from 
the first to the second year. Economic performance is 
best indicated by the cost of production per pig. This 
not only decreased on average, but also the maximum 
decreased. These two years of production statistics 
even with wide variation among firms within each 
year give some evidence that mature sow herds and 
older sow-farrowing firms perform better. The new 
firm may follow a "learning curve,” at least the 
average data do suggest that the group of firms im­
proved the second year. Further gains in average 
technical and economic efficiency may result in the 
third and fourth years as herds become better 
established and owners and managers become more 
proficient as a result of experience and learning. We 
would expect the gains to diminish in the third and 
fourth years and to be lost in wide individual or ran­
dom variation.
was high enough to cover costs and debt service. If 
reproduction was efficient and costs were low, extra 
debt was repaid. Recalculations were not necessary 
each production cycle. It seemed preferable to the 
board members to charge the pigs out to members at 
or above expected total cost of production. In 20 firms, 
the price of pigs was set by the board as low as 
possible—just enough to cover production costs and 
debt repayment. Recalculations were made for each 
production cycle.
In 14 of the firms, pigs were priced according to 
the market— i.e., by a formula based on the Iowa 
Department of Agriculture "pink sheet” of feeder pig 
prices or by a formula based on a specified local 
butcher hog market. Four firms sold most of their 
feeder pigs on a public market to nonmembers and 
did not need to price pigs to members. Seven firms 
finish feeder pigs and market them as butcher hogs 
and, thus, did not need to price feeder pigs. A distribu­
tion of firms by pricing schemes used is presented in 
Table 19.
Although the sow-farrowing firms are relatively 
young, the pricing scheme originally employed by 
most firms has remained unchanged. Only three 
firms changed the way in which feeder pigs were 
priced to members. It seems the scheme for pricing 
feeder pigs may have been an important element of 
the original agreement among members to cooperate 
with each other in the production of feeder pigs.
Table 19. The Distribution of Firms by Feeder Pig Pricing Schemes.
Number of firms
Pricing scheme using the pricing scheme
Price set by board 40
Pricing of feeder pigs
Price set by board explicitly at
T-v i i cost of production plus debtr irms priced feeder pigs to members by one of two repayment 20
basic pricing processes. The price charged members Price set by board> basis not
was either set by the board on the basis of production specified 20
costs and required debt retirement or determined on PriCe based on market price u
the basis of current market prices of feeder or butcheri g&J l p* i Ar\ p* i • Price based on market pricenogs. Of the 65 firms surveyed, 40 firms set the price of feeder pigs 10
charged to members in advance, 14 determined the „ . . . „ ' 'G  * Price based on market price
price on the basis of current market prices, and 11 did of butcher hogs 4
not need to price feeder pigs to members. In 20 of the Feeder p u§ sold directly by firm
65 firms surveyed, the base price charged members on open market 4
for 40-pound feeder pigs was set in advance by judg- Feeder pigs are not priced but
ment by the board. The price was set rather and marketed aa 7
arbitrarily by members at a level that they thought _________ _______________ ______________________
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MANAGEMENT OF THE FIRM
Characteristics of the board-manager relationship
Management and ownership are vested in dif­
ferent individuals. Thus the sow-farrowing firm re­
quires an interpersonal board-manager relationship. 
The nature and quality of the manager-board rela­
tionship varies among firms in Iowa. Ownership and 
management are not distinct in typical farm firms or 
even in closely held farm corporations. Hence, there 
may have been little experience among the members 
of sow-farrowing firms in corporate-style relations 
between the board and the hired manager.
The definite separation between ownership and 
management in Iowa sow-farrowing firms is in­
dicated by the fact that, of the 65 firms surveyed, 57 
(87.7%) employed a manager who was not also a part 
owner of the firm he operated. Thus the manager is 
generally excluded from sharing as an owner in 
capital returns and appreciation. Nearly all members 
are farmers and agribusinessmen and very familiar 
with swine production. Thus most owners probably 
feel qualified to share in management and provide 
considerable day-to-day advice to the manager. In the 
typical case of industrial corporate board-manager re­
lations, the board members would be unqualified and 
uninterested in affirming day-to-day management 
advice.
From a series of questions answered by both mem­
bers and managers, it was determined that the rela­
tionship between members and manager varied from 
highly centralized (board controlled most manage­
ment questions) to highly decentralized (manager 
controlled most features of the day-to-day manage­
ment).
Board chairmen and managers each were asked 
who had responsibility for deciding and executing 
each of nine specific tasks. The board chairmen’s 
perceptions of the division of responsibility are pre­
sented in Table 20. The managers’ perceptions of the 
division of the same responsibilities are presented in 
Table 21. According to the majority of board 
chairmen, managers were largely responsible for 5 of 
the 9 operations; namely, culling sows, ordering feed, 
selecting boars, hiring labor, and keeping production 
records. Most board chairmen believed that the board 
had retained responsibility for 4 of the 9 activities; 
namely, purchasing major equipment, deciding 
sources of feed, pricing feeder pigs, and keeping the 
firm’s financial records. The most frequently shared 
responsibility was for purchasing major equipment, 
with 29% of the board chairmen reporting that this 
activity was a shared responsibility. In a few firms, 
outside specialists had specific responsibilities, such 
as breeding stock companies for selecting boars or 
professional accountants to keep the firm’s financial 
records.
In general, managers felt that they were responsi­
ble for executing more activities than board chairmen 
felt managers were responsible for executing. Clear 
division of responsibility and consistent understand-
Table 20. Board Chairmen*s Perceptions of the Division of 
Responsibility.
The number and percentage of firms for which the board chairman 
reported the responsibility for executing selected activities 
was assigned to the manager or board.
Activity _________Person responsible for activity
Responsibility *
Manager______ Board____________shared_______ Other
No. % No. 1 No. % No. .. X
Culling sows 58 (89.2) 1 ( 1.5) 6 ( 9.2) 0 ( 0)
Ordering feed 43 (69.4) 14 (22.6) 4 ( 6.5) 1 ( 1.6)
Selecting boars 41 (63.1) 8 (12.3) 11 (16.9) 5 ( 7.7)
Hiring labor 38 (58.5) 18 (27.7) 8 (12.3) 1 ( 1.5)
Purchasing major 
equipment 5 ( 7.7) 40 (61.6) 19 (29.2) 1 ( 1.5)
Deciding sources of 
feed purchases 8 (12.3) 44 (67.7) 11 (16.9) 2 ( 3.0)
Keeping production 
records 56 (86.1) 4 ( 6.1) 4 ( 6.2) 1 ( 1.5)
Pricing feeder pigs 4 ( 6.4) 54 (87.1) 3 ( 4.8) 1 ( 1.6)
Keeping financial 
records 12 (18.5) 39 (60.0) 9 (13.8) 5 ( 7.6)
Table 21. Managers* Perceptions of the Division of Responsibility
The number and percentage of firms for which the manager reported 
responsibility for executing the selected activities was directly 
assigned to the manager.
Activity Manager directly
Someone other 
than manager
No. % No. %
Culling sows 62 (98.4) 1 (1.6)
Ordering feed 36 (57.1) 27 (42.9)
Selecting boars 45 (71.4) 18 (28.6)
Hiring labor 48 (76.2) 15 (23.8)
Purchasing major 
equipment 36 (57.1) 27 (42.9)
Deciding sources of 
feed purchases 19 (30.2) 44 (69.8)
Keeping production 
records 59 (93.7) 4 ( 6.3)
Pricing feeder pigs 10 (16.4) 51 (83.6)
Keeping financial 
records 23 (36.5) 40 (63.5)
ing of shared responsibility is required for good 
board-manager relations. The potential exists for 
misunderstanding in Iowa sow-farrowing firms. The 
amount of authority and responsibility that the board 
evidently wanted to delegate and thought that it had 
delegated was less than the amount of delegation of 
authority perceived and accepted by the manager. 
Managers as a group seemingly were willing to ac­
cept more responsibility than members were willing 
to give them.
Part of the seeming discrepancy may be due to dif­
ferent conceptions or interpretations of the definition 
of aw activity. For example, since no minimum dollar 
requm ment was specified to constitute an equipment 
purchi- it was not explicit what differentiated a 
minor equipment purchase from a major purchase. 
Ordering feed was intended to mean requesting feed 
delivery, but it may have been confused by board 
chairmen and managers with formulation of rations
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or selection of a feed company as a continuing source 
of large quantities of feed, grain or supplement. Also, 
the definition of "responsibility” for an activity may 
have differed between board chairmen and managers. 
For example, the manager may be required to collect 
receipts of all financial transactions, but the 
secretary-treasurer may actually process all financial 
transactions. Thus since part of the activity is done by 
the manager and part by a board member, both may 
feel they are directly responsible for keeping finan­
cial records of the firm.
Firms used several methods of defining the 
responsibilities of the manager and board. In total, 53 
managers felt that there was a clear definition of 
their responsibility. Of these, 21 indicated that their 
responsibilities were explicitly outlined in a written 
contract or personnel policy. The remaining 32 
managers indicated that there was no written agree­
ment between the board and manager. Nevertheless, 
they thought that both the board and manager had a 
good mutual understanding regarding the division of 
responsibility. Job descriptions and proceedings of 
board meetings were the most common channels for 
communicating the division of responsibility when 
there was no written contract or personnel policy.
Approximately half of the managers have written 
contracts with the firm Of the 63 managers who 
responded, 31 did not have a contract with the firm. In 
addition, many written contracts did not specify the 
manager’s responsibilities. Of the 32 managers with 
contracts, only 21 indicated that the contract explicit­
ly outlined their responsibilities. Of the 32 board 
chairmen of firms that had contracts with their 
managers, only 23 indicated that the contract ex­
plicitly specified manager and board responsibilities. 
This indicates very close agreements between 
chairmen and managers at least on the explicitness of 
contracted duties. The contract usually specified the 
manager’s base salary, other benefits, and the nature 
of the cash incentive plan.
Manager turnover
Although most of the firms are relatively young, 
less than half still employ the original manager hired 
when the firm was organized. Of the 65 firms sur­
veyed, 30 have not made a management change while 
35 have made at least one management change. Fif­
teen firms have made three or more management 
changes. Of the 42 firms organized before 1975, 11 
employed the manager hired when the firm was or­
ganized. The number of different managers employed 
by all firms and the number employed by the older 
firms are presented in Table 22. Firms are classified 
by the number of different managers that they have 
employed and by their year of organization in Table 
23. Clearly the proportion of firms with the original 
manager is less among those firms that have been or­
ganized longer.
In all, 56 management changes have occurred in 
the 65 Iowa firms. Thirty-eight of these changes were 
from the original manager to a second manager.
Table 22. The Distribution of Firms by Number of Different Managers 
Employed
Different managers All firms Firms organized before 1975
1 30 11
2 20 16
3 11 11
4 4 4
TOTAL 65 42
Table 23. The Distribution of Firms by Number of 
Employed and by Year of Organization.
Different Managers
No. of different managers
Year organized i 2 3 4
1972 and earlier i 0 1 3
1973 7 8 3 1
1974 3 8 7 0
1975 5 2 1 0
1976 13 2 0 0
Board chairmen estimated that 17 of these 38
original manager changes resulted from the board’s 
dissatisfaction with the original manager’s 
performance. The original manager initiated 20 of the 
manager changes. In most instances, the manager left 
because he had an alternative job opportunity and 
(or) because he was dissatisfied with the job. In a few 
instances, the manager left because of health or 
personal reasons. Board chairmen estimated that 10 
of 12 second management changes and three of four 
third management changes resulted from the board’s 
dissatisfaction with the manager’s performance. A 
larger proportion of the second and third manage­
ment changes was initiated by the board of directors.
Of the original 65 managers, 29 are still employed 
with the original firm. Some of the original managers 
lacked swine-management experience, were forced to 
work with a herd of young gilts in a new facility with 
which they were unfamiliar, used untested produc­
tion procedures, and tried to satisfy a board with 
higher-than-realistic expectations. It is not surpris­
ing that in many instances the actual performance of 
the firm did not match the performance expected by 
the owners or the manager himself. Several board 
members failed to anticipate the slow start-up of a 
new firm and the smaller-than-average number of 
pigs the first year. The manager may have been 
blamed or blamed himself for "poor” performance 
when, actually, performance was average but short of 
expectations. Often, after the first manager was 
replaced, the firm matured, performance improved, 
and board expectations were adjusted to a realistic 
level. Improved performance may have been more a 
result of maturation than of greater ability of the 
second manager. Of course, the ability, attention, and 
methods of managers do have a large influence on 
reproductive performance. Careful observation, at­
tention to details, and good sanitation and sow nutri-
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tion are key factors in both the technical and 
economic performance of the firm.
Manager’s compensation
The total compensation of managers came in three 
forms— a guaranteed cash salary, noncash fringe 
benefits, and a cash incentive based on productivity. 
First, the guaranteed base salary paid to managers 
was typically $1000 or $1100 per month. A few firms 
had a base salary of less than $1000, usually because 
the firm provided fringe benefits such as a house and 
vehicle in lieu of cash. Second, most firms used an in­
centive plan under which the managers (or other 
employees) got $0.25 to $2.00 for each pig produced 
above a minimum number. Third, most firms pro­
vided the manager one or more fringe benefits such as 
housing, utilities, insurance, paid vacation, meat, or 
use of a pickup. Of course, the total compensation and 
real income to the manager was the sum of the value 
to him of all three components. The level of compensa­
tion and the mix of composition of income varied con­
siderably among firms.
The yearly base salary paid to managers by Iowa 
firms ranged from $8,820 to $24,000, with an average 
yearly base salary of $12,970, or just over $1000 per 
month. The distribution of managers by base salary 
intervals is presented in Table 24.
Table 24. The Distribution of Managers by Intervals of Yearly Base 
Salary.
Base salary ($) Number of managers
Under 10,000 7
10,001 - 12,000 23
12,001 - 14,000 13
14,001 - 16,000 7
16,001 - 18,000 4
Over 18,001 2
TOTAL 56
Base salaries of $1000 per month and $1100 per 
month were typical of Iowa firms. Of the 56 firms that 
responded, 18 paid managers a base salary of $1000 
per month, and 5 firms paid managers $1100 per 
month. Base salaries paid to managers tended to be 
lowered if there were large fringe benefits and 
generous compensation potential in the incentive 
plan. Therefore, the base salary alone is a rather inac­
curate indication of the manager’s total compensa­
tion. Unfortunately the survey did not gather enough 
information to indicate the number of managers by 
intervals of total compensation.
Cash incentive plans
Most firms employed their manager under a cash 
incentive plan. Of the 64 firms that responded, 57 had 
an incentive plan for the manager. The boards were 
very concerned with creating an incentive for the 
manager to try hard to get the maximum number of
pigs possible from the facility. The rate of return per 
dollar of investment by the board members is directly 
related to the number of pigs produced. Of the 57 
firms with incentive plans, 45 based plans on the 
number of pigs produced annually. In 25 of these 
firms, managers received a fixed payment per pig for 
all pigs produced over a minimum number. In the re­
maining 20 firms, a larger payment per pig was made 
for all pigs produced above a second minimum.
Firms were asked to describe the provisions of 
their incentive plans. Of the 57 firms with incentive 
plans, 27 provided specific numbers regarding the 
minimum production standard, the base payment per 
pig, and the payment structure of the incentive plan. 
These three components determine compensation 
potential of the incentive plan or profit-sharing plan 
between the firm and the manager.
The incentive threshold is the minimum number 
of pigs that must be produced annually in the facility 
before the incentive plan becomes effective. Since 
firms vary in size of facility, the minimum number or 
threshold for each incentive plan was converted to the 
number of pigs to be produced per unit of rated 
capacity annually (i.e., pigs divided by rated capacity). 
For the 27 firms that sufficiently detailed their incen­
tive plans, the threshold levels ranged from 6.2 to 18, 
with an average of 12.8 pigs per sow annually. Thus, 
the manager of a 500-sow unit with an incentive plan 
based on a 12.8-pig threshold would have to produce 
6400 (12.8 x 500) pigs before the incentive plan would 
become effective. An incentive plan may have an at­
tractive payment schedule per pig, but, if the 
threshold is high, the plan may seldom be in effect. If 
so the plan has little compensation potential or incen­
tive for the manager. The threshold should be set at a 
break-even or below-average level for the incentive 
plan to be effective and reward above-average 
performance.
The second major component of the incentive plan 
is the per-pig payment for pigs produced above the 
threshold. For the 27 firms that sufficiently described 
their incentive plans, the per-pig payment for the 
first pigs above the threshold ranged from $0.15 to 
$2.25, with an average of $1.20 per pig. Among the in­
centive plans, the amount of the per-pig payment 
seemed to be larger if there was a relatively high 
threshold level and lower with relatively high 
manager’s base salary. Thus, given equal base 
salaries, firms seemed to offer lower (higher) incen­
tive payments per pig if they offered a bonus above a 
re latively  lower (higher) threshold level. 
Furthermore given equal threshold levels, firms 
seemed to offer lower (higher) incentive payments per 
pig if they provided higher (lower) base salaries.
The third major component of the incentive plan is 
the rate structure of the payment per pig in the plan. 
Of the 45 firms that based incentive plans on the 
number of pigs produced annually, 25 firms had a 
fixed payment structure (i.e., paid the same amount 
per pig for a//pigs produced over the threshold level), 
and 20 firms had a graduated payment structure 
(paid an increasing amount per pig for successive ip-
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crements of pigs produced over the threshold level). 
Not all plans with a progressive rate structure 
created the same incentive, however. Some 
thresholds were high, and the bracket was wide and 
the increment in payment per pig small, thus offering 
little bonus compensation potential even with a 
graduated payment schedule. If so, the total com­
pensation would be not significantly different from 
the base pay even when reproduction is far above 
average. Other graduated incentive plans started at a 
threshold below the average of 15 pigs per sow per 
year and provided significant increments in payment 
per pig at 16,17,18,19, and 20 pigs per sow per year. 
This led to substantial bonus payments and signifi­
cant profit-sharing potential if the firm obtained high 
reproductive efficiency. All elements of the incentive 
plan— increments, production threshold, and pay­
ments per pig— varied for firms with graduated pay­
ment schedules. Several bonus thresholds began at 12 
or 14 pigs per sow. Payment increments at every pig 
or every 2 pigs per sow per year were common. Per-pig 
bonuses starting at $0.25 and going up by increments 
of $0.25, $0.50, or $1.00 also were common.
Because the profitability of the firm depends on 
the number of pigs produced, the incentive plan based 
only on the number of pigs above a break-even point 
is a means by which the firm and manager share 
profits. If each pig over the break-even level is worth 
$30 or more, then $0.25 to the manager is a very low 
rate-of-profit share. Even 6 or 7 dollars for a few pigs 
at very high levels of efficiency is only 20 to 25% 
profit sharing. The compensation potential of an in­
centive plan indicates the degree to which the firm is 
willing to share profits with the manager.
The compensation potentials of three typical Iowa 
firms are examined to illustrate the difference in the 
compensation potential of alternative plans. The 
figures used are based on actual incentive plans of 
three Iowa firms, but a 500-sow unit is assumed for all 
three to facilitate comparison. Firm 1 pays the 
manager $0.25 per pig for all pigs produced over 7000 
(14 pigs per sow annually). Firm 2 pays the manager 
$2.00 per pig for all pigs produced over 5000 (10 pigs 
per sow annually). Firm 3 pays the manager $1.00 per 
pig for the first 500 pigs over 6000 (12 pigs per sow), 
$2.00 per pig over 6500 (13 pigs per sow), $3.00 per pig 
over 7000 (14 pigs per sow), etc. Incentive payments 
by production levels for each plan are presented in 
Table 25.
Table 25. Manager's Annual Cash Incentive Payment Under Three Typical 
Incentive Plans Applied to a 500-Unit Firm with Production
Levels from 12 to 20 Pigs Per Sow Annually.
Annual production level Managers cash incentive (dollars)Total
pigs
Pigs 
per sow Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3
5,000 10 0 0 0
6,000 12 0 2,000 0
7,000 14 0 4,000 1,500
8,000 16 250 6,000 5,000
9,000 18 500 8,000 10,500
10,000 20 750 10,000 18,000
Firm 1 created little incentive because its plan 
has low compensation potential. The plan requires a 
relatively high production before any bonus (14 pigs 
per sow annually) and offers a relatively low per-pig 
payment ($0.25 per pig). The plan has a fixed per-pig 
payment structure even for the very profitable levels 
of performance. There is little variation in total com­
pensation even with wide variation in production effi­
ciency. The very profitable level of 20 pigs per sow an­
nually would give the manager only $7.50 bonus. 
Thus, neither exemplary reproduction success in the 
facility nor financial disaster for the firm would have 
much effect on the manager’s total compensation. 
Firm 2 creates more incentive, but the bonus is 
probably too large at lower levels of productivity 
when the firm would be unprofitable. The incentive 
plan of Firm 2 begins a bonus at the low production 
threshold of 10 pigs per sow per year, which is far 
below average. The high payment per pig of $2.00 
would be paid out of capital not profit. At 10 pigs per 
sow, the manager probably should be fined rather 
than given a bonus. At 10 pigs most firms probably 
are very unprofitable; the profit to the firm on the 
20th pig may be over $20,000, but the firm shares on­
ly 5% or $1000 with the manager (i.e., 500 pigs x 
$2.00). The graduated incentive plan of Firm 3 is 
characterized by a moderate production threshold (12 
pigs per sow annually) and a moderate initial pay­
ment of $1.00 per pig, but the graduation rapidly in­
creases the bonus. This plan shares $8.00 per pig for 
the very profitable production level of 19.5 to 20 pigs 
per sow per year.
The incentive plan should reflect, in the 
manager’s compensation, differences in labor produc­
tivity and should not shift the entrepreneurs’ risk to 
the employee. That means, the manager should not be 
charged for large pig losses over which he had no con­
trol such as losses that might result from a tornado. 
Nor should the manager have his income influenced 
by the price of hogs or feeder pigs on the open market, 
an important variable but one over which the 
manager has no influence. The incentive plan should 
reward and motivate high facility output and high 
labor productivity.
The effect of the incentive plan on reproductive 
performance is important to owners and investors. 
Nevertheless, many firms in our survey were reluc­
tant to specifically detail their incentive plans. Thus 
because of lack of data and wide year-to-year varia­
tion, the direct, precise relationship between incen­
tive plan and reproductive performance could not be 
established.
Fringe benefits
Manager’s total compensation also varied by the 
value of fringe benefits received from the firm. Only 
eight of the 65 firms surveyed provided the manager 
with no fringe benefits. Forty-seven firms provided 
the manager with at least housing. Good-quality 
housing is attractive to a manager and his wife. Hous­
ing can be a tax-free form of compensation to the
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manager if he is required by the board to live there as 
part of his job.
A total of 44 firms provided free of charge all 
household utilities for the manager. Nine firms pro­
vided medical and health insurance. Eight firms pro­
vided meat (usually pork) for the manager. Some 
firms provided travel expenses for the manager to at­
tend meetings and swine clinics. Some provided the 
use of a pickup truck owned by the firm for his 
personal transportation.
Of the 61 firms that responded, 47 had an explicit 
vacation and sick leave policy. The mean number of 
paid vacation days provided by the 44 firms that re­
ported an explicit number of days was 11 per year. 
The mean number of sick leave days for the 15 firms 
that specified an explicit number of days was four per 
year. Many more firms provided sick leave but were 
not explicit as to the maximum number of days al­
lowed per year. The manager could take sick leave as 
needed, and the board chairman did not believe the 
manager would abuse the policy. In a few firms, there 
was no explicit vacation or sick leave policy because 
the manager was free to take sick or annual leave as 
he chose, but was responsible to hire replacement 
labor and pay for such replacement labor out of his 
total income.
Human-capital characteristics of managers
Capital can be broadly defined as anything put in 
place at a current sacrifice to provide a stream of 
useful future services. If so, human capital is the 
ability or capacity of people, acquired at some 
sacrifice, that can provide a stream of useful services. 
Human-capital investment activities include formal 
and informal learning, experience on a similar job, 
physical fitness, skill development, and information 
accumulation from reading and conversing. All may 
add to the ability of a swine farm manager to increase 
the number of pigs produced. The amount and type of 
human capital possessed by the manager should in­
fluence his ability to organize the "pig factory” and ef­
fectively execute daily work routines. If he is able and 
motivated to detect nutritional and health problems 
early, he may be able to take appropriate action 
shortly after problems arise and thus reduce death 
loss. Most observers and owners of sow-farrowing 
firms agree that managerial ability and incentive are 
the key factors in determining the number and quali­
ty of pigs produced. The reproductive efficiency of the 
sow herd (i.e., the output of the facility and, hence, the 
rate of return on the investment made by owners) is 
very dependent on the activities of the manager. But 
good management is complicated to define and dif­
ficult to identify. The formal education, informal 
education, and training of managers are the only ob­
jective indicators of human capital examined in this 
section.
Formal education varied widely among managers 
of Iowa firms. The years of schooling completed by 
managers ranged from 8 to 18, with an average of 13 
years of formal education. The distribution of
Table 26. The Distribution of Managers by Years of Formal 
Education.
Years of formal education Number of managers
Less than 12 5
12 (high school) 30
13 3
14 (junior college) 12
15 1
16 (college) 10
18 (graduate work) 4
TOTAL 65
managers by years of formal education is presented in 
Table 26.
Only five managers have completed less than 12 
years of formal education. Of the remaining 60, 30 
completed high school, and 30 went beyond high 
school. Ten were college graduates, and four 
managers took postgraduate work in areas related to 
swine production.
Two methods of informal education or human- 
capital formulation are considered— experience and 
communication. Relevant knowledge and skills can 
be acquired by the manager from working on another 
livestock farm. The most relevant experience is 
operating another large-scale hog operation. An ex­
perienced manager has increased ability to design the 
best production techniques in operating the firm. 
Most of the managers did have previous experience in 
swine production. Of the 64 managers who responded, 
54 (74%) were raised on a livestock farm, and 38 
(59%) had previously managed another large hog 
operation. However, 26 firms hired managers that 
had no previous swine-farm managerial experience. 
The average number of years of experience for the 38 
that had previously managed a hog operation was 5 
years. The average number of litters farrowed an­
nually per manager with previous swine-farm ex­
perience was 960 per year, a relatively large size. 
Twenty-seven of the 38 experienced managers had 
less than 5 years of experience.
The ages of managers ranged from 19 to 51 years, 
with the average age being 30 years. Most of the 
managers were in their 20s. The distribution of 
managers by age groups is presented in Table 27.
Table 27. The Distribution of Managers by Age Groups. 
Manager's age Number of managers
Under 20 4
2 1 - 2 5  20
2 6 - 3 0  18
3 1 - 3 5  5
3 6 - 4 0  7
4 1 - 4 5  5
Over 46 5
TOTAL ' 64
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The second method of informal education concerns 
the channels of communication used by the managers 
to provide themselves with information on pork- 
production technology and disease control. Of the 65 
managers surveyed, 51 received at their home at least 
one swine journal or magazine, 51 attended at least 
one short course on swine production and disease con­
trol within the previous year, 47 received technical 
guidance from a private consultant, 42 used informa­
tion from sales representatives of different pork- 
related industries, 54 used information from interac­
tion with other managers, and 8 used services of the 
Iowa Cooperative Extension Service. On average, the 
managers of the Iowa sow-farrowing firms received 
three swine journals, regularly attended approx­
imately three short courses or clinics per year, and re­
ceived technical guidance from a private consulting 
service approximately once a month.
Job training is the final human-capital charac­
teristic examined in this section. Two forms of job 
training are used by Iowa firms. The first type of 
training is formal preservice. Firms send managers to 
relatively short, but intensive, training sessions that 
cover many aspects of confined swine management. A  
breeding stock company and a feed company usually 
conduct such 1- or 2-week training sessions at or near 
the company’s home office. Of the 65 managers sur­
veyed, 15 participated in a special sow-farrowing firm 
management training program
The second type of training is on the job. Several 
firms directly or indirectly hired a private consulting 
service to design production techniques and guide 
day-to-day procedures for the manager to follow in 
the operation of the facility. Feed or breeding stock 
companies will contract to provide such an in-service 
training for a specified period. In addition, the feed or 
breeding stock of the company must be purchased by 
the firm. A private consultant visits the operation on 
a regular basis, and he is on call whenever a special 
problem arises in the firm Although all private con­
sulting services were considered a source of informal 
education, perhaps there should be a distinction 
between the more intensive training and supervisory 
services for the inexperienced manager and the less 
intensive consulting services for the experienced 
manager. The more intensive training services tend 
to structure the production process, whereas consult­
ing services are more "trouble shooting” and directed 
only at specific problems of the firm
Many managers regularly receive some kind of 
consulting or technical guidance. Of the 65 managers 
surveyed, 45 received guidance on disease prevention 
and treatment, 38 received guidance on feeding prac­
tices, 30 received guidance on breeding practices, and 
16 received guidance on waste-handling procedures. 
A local veterinarian or feed salesman usually was the 
source of consultation, but in many instances, breed­
ing stock companies and (or) feed companies provided 
a regular consulting service. The frequency of the 
guidance usually was once or twice a month, plus a 
right to call on an as-needed basis.
A summary of the human-capital characteristics
Table 28. Human-Capital Characteristics of Managers in Iowa Sow 
Farrowing Firms.
Human—capital Number o f■ Percent of
characteristic managers total
1. Years of formal education completed
Less than 12 5 8
12 30 46
More than 12 30 46
Informal education
Farm background 54 83
Swine management experience 38 58
Communication channels
Received swine journal 51 78
Attended short courses on 
swine production 51 78
Received consulting services 47 72
Job training
Received specialized preservice 
training 15 23
of managers in Iowa sow-farrowing firms is presented 
in Table 28.
Sources of manager’s job satisfaction and dis­
satisfaction
Managers were asked to report the principal 
sources of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction that 
they experienced in operating the sow-farrowing 
facility. The independence of the work, the financial 
compensation, and the knowledge of swine production 
acquired from operating the facility were the three 
major sources of job satisfaction. The lack of days off, 
the long hours, and the rather unpleasant working 
environment were the three major sources of dis­
satisfaction. The numbers of managers mentioning or 
giving a specific rank to each source of job satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction are presented in Tables 29 and 30. 
Managers varied considerably in the ranking of 
sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. To obtain 
the general or overall average rank of the sources of 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction for all managers, a 
weighted index was devised. Each manager ranking a
Table 29. The Number of Managers by Rank of Each Source of Job 
Satisfaction.
______ Rank __________ Index of .
Source of satisfaction 1 2  3 Checked r,„ec=n „„i,2 overall rank —
Independence of work 25 7 12 12 . 157
Salary end other benefits 12 25 8 11 150
Knowledge acquired 10 13 14 18 125
Employ specialized 
skills 3 9 9 25 82
Working environment 3 2 10 25 63
Other 4 4 1 1 31
The value of the index for each source is the weighted sum of the 
number of managers ranking that source. A rank 1 was weighted 4, 
a 2 was weighted 3, a 3 was weighted 2, and a check only regis­
tered 1.
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Table 30. The Number of Managers 
Dissatisfaction.
by Rank of Each Source of Job
Source of dissatisfaction 1
Rank
2 3 Checked
Index of ^  
overall rank —
Lack of days off 19 11 3 6 121
Long hours 7 16 3 A 86
Working environment 13 5 8 3 86
Too many bosses 3 1 1 5 22
Practices too specialized 0 0 9 1 9
Other 2 3 1 1 20
— The value of the index for each source is the weighted sum of the 
number of managers ranking that source. A rank 1 was weighted 4, 
a 2 was weighted 3, a 3 was weighted 2, and a check only 
registered 1.
source first was given a 4, and each manager ranking 
a source second was given a 3, and so on.
The rankings of each source, the weights assigned 
to the rank, and a total point calculation are con­
tained in Tables 29 and 30.
"Other” sources of satisfaction usually included 
"the challenge to make the firm successful” or "the 
enjoyment derived from working with livestock.” 
"Other” sources of dissatisfaction usually included 
"the responsibility and pressure involved in making 
the unit successful” or "the monotonous routines in­
volved in the work.”
Manager’s estimation of hours worked
The manager’s estimate of hours worked per week 
ranged from 43 to 95, with an average of 60 hours per 
week. Of the 63 managers who responded, 22 reported 
that the number of hours worked did not vary 
significantly from week to week. The remaining 41 
managers reported weekly variations resulting from 
scheduling problems. These managers reported work­
ing an average of 70 hours for 16 weeks of the year as 
a result of clustered farrowings.
The allocation of hours among certain activities is 
presented in Table 31.
Because a number of firms were just beginning 
production, some managers had been spending an un­
usually large amount of time supervising the breed­
ing of young gilts. The number of hours spent in this
Table 31. The Allocation of Manager's Hours.
activity is expected to decrease as young firms de­
velop controlled production cycles. The miscellaneous 
category includes such activities as maintaining the 
physical plant, moving and sorting of hogs, observing 
pig behavior, supervising labor, and processing baby 
pigs. In a number of the larger units, the manager 
functions as the overall coordinator of the operation. 
He has subordinates in charge of the gestation, far­
rowing, and nursery activities of the operation. The 
number of hours he worked per week was not broken 
down for specific activities, but was classified in the 
miscellaneous category under the supervisory activi­
ty. This may account for the large number of hours 
per week in the miscellaneous category. Managers 
emphasized that the allocation of hours among the ac­
tivities listed varied from week to week.
Because both the board chairman and the 
manager were asked to estimate the number of hours 
that the manager worked, the discrepancy in percep­
tions of hours worked can be calculated. The dif­
ference in estimated hours worked by the manager 
ranged from 0 to 33, with an average discrepancy of 
7.8 hours per week. Only seven board chairmen 
estimated that the manager worked more hours per 
week than what managers reported; the remaining 
managers estimated they worked more hours per 
week than what board chairmen had reported. 
However, 27 firms had discrepancies of less than 5 
hours per week.
Of the 65 managers surveyed, 15 reported that 
their wives directly assisted in  the operation of the 
facility on a full-time basis. The most common ac­
tivities performed by the manager’s wife were the 
processing of baby pigs (clipping teeth and giving 
baby pig shots), assisting sows in farrowing, and 
keeping production records. The managers estimated 
that their wives worked an average of 43 hours per 
week. Some promoters and organizers of sow- 
farrowing firms believe that there is high effective­
ness in the man-wife management team, but other 
sow-farrowing firm consultants feel it is not better for 
both the husband and wife to work in the facility.
Several managers reported that their wives were 
part-time participants in the operation of the facility 
(worked less than 20 hours per week). Those wives 
participating part-time most often assisted the 
manager in keeping production records.
Activity Hours worked per week
Supervision of breeding 11.7
Super rision of farrowing 9.5
Feeding 9.0
Cleaning 8.7
Medical treatment A.6
Record keeping 4.6
Miscellaneous 11.9
TOTAL 60.0
BOARD CHAIRMEN S ASSESSMENT OF 
THE INVESTMENT
Investment decision criteria
The formation of a sow-farrowing firm is one of 
many investment alternatives available to individual 
farmers and agribusinessmen. Presumably, the in­
vestor’s decision to form or join a sow-farrowing firm 
is based upon a judgment or calculation of the rate of 
return on his investment or the value of shares in the 
firm relative to their cost. However, before-the-fact 
evaluation of the investment in a sow-farrowing firm 
is complicated. Because sow-farrowing firms usually
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price pigs at cost of production, the firm can only have 
gross revenue enough to cover production costs and 
required debt retirement. Thus the firm generates no 
profit and pays no explicit return to shareholders’ 
equity capital. Most of the sow-farrowing firms seem 
to be run as nonprofit subsidiaries. Investors seem to 
participate not to make a profit on producing feeder 
pigs but to realize a return on feeding out the pigs. 
Thus their expected or realized return on their invest­
ment is proportionate to the number of low-cost, high- 
quality pigs that they receive from the firm. An im­
plicit net return to each farm making an investment 
in a sow-farrowing firm can be calculated only by 
evaluating the difference between that farm’s 
alternative cost of obtaining feeder pigs and the price 
paid to the sow-farrowing firm. The number of pigs 
received from the sow-farrowing firm times the re­
duction in cost per pig is the gross return on the sow- 
farrowing firm investment.
In general, there are two alternative sources of 
feeder pigs. The first is the open market of auctions or 
private sales. Owners could directly purchase feeder 
pigs in the open market. One could calculate an im­
plicit net return to the sow-farrowing firm by subtrac­
ting the month-by-month amount paid to the sow- 
farrowing firm from the month-by-month open- 
market price of similar-quality feeder pigs. The "price 
of similar quality pigs,” however, is not readily de­
terminable. In addition, one must add to the auction 
price the cost of search, transactions, additional death 
loss, and loss of tax shelter from income tax by invest­
ment in a depreciable asset. Some of the values of the 
sow-farrowing firm are that the pigs are high-quality, 
not stressed, locally available, and consistently sold to 
members at a price equal to the cost of production. 
Thus, sow-farrowing firm members avoid the large 
variations in open-market feeder pig prices, the un­
certainty of health, and variability in grade and 
finishing costs associated with variation in quality of 
open-market pigs. For several members of Iowa sow- 
farrowing firms, the open market was their relevant 
alternative, and the certainty of price, quality, and 
finishing cost was an important consideration in join­
ing a sow-farrowing firm
The second alternative source of feeder pigs is the 
farmer himself. The cost of pigs from this source is 
what it would cost the owner to produce his own 
feeder pigs. This cost is somewhat subjective since it 
is the value to the specific producer of what he would 
have to give up to produce the same quantity and 
quality of feeder pigs on his own farm. The challenge 
in estimating the sacrifice to produce feeder pigs at 
home is to accurately identify the true labor and 
capital costs of producing feeder pigs in a multien­
terprise firm. Calculation of sacrifices would have to 
be comprehensive and the value of sacrifices both ob­
jective and subjective. The alternate use return or op­
portunity cost that a producer places on his own labor 
and capital inputs in a multiproduct firm and 
household can vary widely. If the data were available, 
the implicit net return on sow-farrowing shares could 
be calculated by dividing the investment in the sow-
farrowing firm into the difference between the 
farmer’s estimate of what it would cost him to pro­
duce the pigs and the cost of pigs received from the 
sow-farrowing firm The gain from the investment is 
directly related to the quantity, quality, and cost of 
pigs that he received from the sow-farrowing firm. 
Thus, each investor, to get a high return of his shares, 
wants the sow-farrowing firm to produce as many 
quality pigs as possible at the lowest possible price.
Satisfactory and unsatisfactory elements of the in­
vestment
Board chairmen were asked to evaluate satisfac­
tory and unsatisfactory elements of the investment. 
The quality of pigs produced and the stability of sup­
ply of feeder pigs were the two most satisfactory ele­
ments of the investment.
Members who were satisfied with the firm’s pro­
duction efficiency also liked obtaining pigs at cost of 
production. The cost of production is more stable than 
the market prices for feeder pigs. Shareholders re­
ported that escape from the work and the close daily 
attention required for efficient sow farrowing also 
was an important source of satisfaction from their 
sow-farrowing firm investment. Four board chairmen 
reported no satisfactory elements from the invest­
ment. Four chairmen reported that it was too early in 
the life of the firm to make an assessment of the in­
vestment.
Breeding problems were the most frequently men­
tioned unsatisfactory element of the investment. Low 
conception rates, especially during the summer and 
among gilts, resulted in fewer pigs than expected and 
caused overcrowding when too many sows got preg­
nant and farrowed in the same week. Unsatisfactory 
management, slow start-up of the firm, disease and 
health problems, and investment cost overruns were 
less significant, but unsatisfactory, elements of the 
investment. A  few board chairmen reported poor- 
quality breeding stock and inflexible building designs 
as unsatisfactory elements of the investment. Five 
board chairmen reported no unsatisfactory elements 
of the investment. The number of board chairmen re­
porting and ranking each satisfactory and unsatisfac­
tory element is presented in Tables 32 and 33.
Table 32. The number of Board Chairmen Reporting and Ranking Each 
Satisfactory Element of the Investment and "Rank Points" 
of Each Element
Total -
Elements
Rank One 
Points- 4
Two
3
Three
2
Reporting
only
rank
points
Quality of pigs 
produced 20 14 7 9 145
Stability of supply 
of pigs 17 17 4 9 136
No direct involvement 
by shareholders 8 7 ii 13 88
Stability of price of 
pigs 3 5 15 5 62
Other 2 0 1 1 11
Rank points are obtained- by multiplying the number of firms under 
each rank times the points per rank and summing across all ranks 
for the.element.
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Pigs per sow per yearTable 33. The number of Board Chairmen Reporting and Ranking Each 
Unsatisfactory Element of the Investment and "Rank 
Points" of Each Element.
Elements
Rank One 
Points- 4
Two
3
Three
2
Reporting
only
Total -  
rank 
points
Breeding problems 19 24 6 7 167,
Management of firm 9 2 7 5 61
Slow start-up 8 5 2 6 57
Disease and health 
problems 8 2 6 7 57
Investment overruns 3 5 5 5 42
Cost of pigs produced 2 2 3 5 25
Quality of pigs 
produced ■ 0 0 1 3 5
Other 5 1 0 4 27
a/— Rank points are obtained by multiplying the number of firms under 
each rank times the points per rank and summing across all ranks 
for the element.
The assessment of the satisfactory and unsatisfac­
tory elements of the investment by board chairmen is 
consistent with initial investor goals as expressed in 
Table 4. The most frequently mentioned incentive for 
organization was "to obtain a reliable supply of 
quality feeder pigs at cost of production.” The most 
frequently mentioned satisfactory element of the in­
vestment was quality of pigs and the second was 
stability of supply, both of which indicate that the 
most widely held goals were met.
Breeding problems
The dominance of 'breeding problems” as the 
most unsatisfactory element of the investment 
prompted further examination of this problem. Board 
chairmen were asked if technical production (i.e., the 
number of pigs produced per sow annually) had 
matched their expectation. Of the 65 board chairmen 
surveyed, 30 felt that technical production had 
matched their expectations, 30 felt that technical pro­
duction had not met their expectations, and 5 felt that 
it was too early to make any assessment. If technical 
production had not met their expectations, board 
chairmen were asked to identify specific production 
problems that had caused the poor performance. Only 
8 of the 30 dissatisfied board chairmen identified the 
number of born pigs per litter as a production 
problem, and only 14 of the 30 identified the number 
of weaned pigs per litter as a serious problem. 
However, 23 of the dissatisfied board chairmen iden­
tified poor conception rates (i.e., low numbers of lit­
ters per sow annually) as a production problem. 
Finally, only 5 of the 30 dissatisfied board chairmen 
identified poor disease control as a production 
problem.
Analysis of the data indicates that an unsatisfac­
tory number of pigs produced per sow annually more 
often results from low conception rates rather than 
from small weaned litter sizes. The number of litters 
produced per sow annually and the average weaned 
litter size are plotted against each other for the 38
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Figure 1. Litters per sow per year versus weaned litter size for 
1976.
firms reporting 1976 production statistics in Figure 1.
A  given number of pigs per sow can be produced 
annually by different combinations of litter size and 
litters per sow annually. For example, 16 pigs per sow 
can be produced from a litter size of 8.0 and two litters 
per sow annually, from a litter size of 7.5 and 2.13 lit­
ters per sow annually, or from a litter size of 8.5 and 
1.88 litters per sow annually. If fewer pigs per sow are 
produced than expected, the problem may result from 
a small litter size and (or) a low number of litters pro­
duced per sow annually. The graph indicates that 
relatively few firms had average litter sizes of less 
than 7.5. Of the 65 firms surveyed, 47 had completed 
one full year of production (i.e., had been in produc­
tion in 1976). Of the 47 firms in production in 1976,41 
reported their average litter size. For the 41 firms, the 
average weaned litter size was 8.34. These data sug­
gest that weaned litter size of sow-farrowing firms is 
above average and not considered a serious produc­
tion problem by board members of most firms in Iowa.
Iowa firms, however, averaged only 1.82 litters per 
sow annually in 1976, which was considered un­
satisfactory. Animal scientists calculate that, in a 
stable-size breeding herd with a gilt population of 25 
percent, it is reasonable to expect 2.1 litters per sow 
annually. This assumes mating on the first post- 
weaning estrus after a 3-week lactation period. The 
survey data suggest that the most serious reproduc­
tion problem in sow-farrowing firms is poor concep­
tion rates, excessive weeks between farrowing and 
conception, which result in a relatively low number of 
litters per sow annually. A number of factors may 
cause poor conception rates in confinement struc­
tures. High temperatures will reduce the quantity 
and quality of boar semen as well as the regularity of 
sows coming in heat. In addition, environmental 
characteristics such as floor surface, light intensity, 
sound levels, and odor may affect conception rates. 
Thus, the building or facility design may significantly 
affect production efficiency. Temperature, ventila­
tion, floor material, space, and location all affect 
breeding environment and may be important aspects 
of building design. Not enough information on build­
ing design was collected to associate breeding en­
vironment with conception rates.
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SUMMARY
The adoption of subsidiary sow-farrowing firms 
by more than 500 Iowa members indicates that 
farmers and other rural residents are willing to 
work within this nontraditional organization form to 
produce feeder pigs. The sow-farrowing firms were 
subsidiaries and organized as subchapter S corpora­
tions among 8 to 10 area farmers and other busi­
nessmen. The principal incentive was not profit from 
the sow-farrowing firm but to provide a reliable 
source of quality feeder pigs at a price equal to pro­
duction costs. Other incentives for participation 
were to release labor from farrowing activities and 
to hire a manager for the farrowing house who 
would be a full-time specialist. Nonfarmers have 
been only a minority in the ownership but relatively 
important in the organization of sow-farrowing 
firms in Iowa.
A hypothesis of the study was that corporate 
structure and hired management of sow-farrowing 
firms might lead to nonfarmer and nonlocal 
participation and financing for pork production. The 
existing sow-farrowing firms in Iowa, however, are 
almost exclusively made up of local farmers using 
their own capital and local credit. There is no 
evidence that sow-farrowing firms have attracted 
significant outside investment to rural areas. Sow- 
farrowing firms are not a substitute for manufactur­
ing branch plants in securing outside capital and 
management to create local jobs. It is not likely that 
much rural industrialization (i.e., growth in area 
employment and value added) will result from sow- 
farrowing firms.
Sow-farrowing firms are rather large enterprises. 
They provided an average of $290,000 worth of pigs 
to members in 1976. Initial investment per firm was 
about $419,000 in 1973 but increased 50% to 
$625,000 in 1976. Buildings and equipment, breed­
ing stock, and land improvements and start-up costs 
account for 95% of total investment. Land is only 5% 
of total initial investment. Most of the investment 
items are wholly or partly produced in Iowa.
The average sow-farrowing firm employed 7280 
man-hours per year, kept 534 sows, and used 14.3 
hours per sow per year. Two full-time employees, i.e., 
a manager and assistant manager, usually operate 
the typical sow-farrowing firm except for occasional 
or supplementary part-time labor totaling less than 
one more full-time equivalent. The sow-farrowing 
firm is a rather capital intensive enterprise requir­
ing more than $200,000 of investment per full-time 
employee.
In 1976, Iowa sow-farrowing firms weaned about 
8000 pigs, or an average of 8.34 pigs per litter, at an 
average cost of $27.55 per pig. On the average, the 
firms secured 1.82 litters per sow annually and 15.18 
feeder pigs per sow annually. When first- and 
second-year production statistics are compared for 
all firms, it seems that, on average, production effi­
ciency has improved as the firms matured. Members
were most often disappointed by the number of lit­
ters per sow per year.
The manager was hired and did not participate 
in ownership in most Iowa sow-farrowing firms. The 
relationship between the manager and board varied 
from highly centralized, where the board controlled 
the operation, to highly decentralized, where the 
manager controlled the operation. Managers quit or 
were fired for poor performance, but most expressed 
relatively little dissatisfaction with board-manager 
relations.
Generally in the Iowa firm, the manager con­
trolled most of the input variables critically influ­
encing reproduction efficiency. Seldom did the 
manager control all the variables critical to profit or 
have incentive to minimize the operating cost per 
month. Most firms used an incentive plan based on 
reproduction efficiency rather than on financial suc­
cess.
More than half of the firms had employed more 
than one manager. Those firms with more pigs per 
sow annually had fewer managers per year. 
Reproduction efficiency, on average, improved from 
the first to the second year. The reproduction 
performance of the new firm under control of the 
first manager frequently did not equal the board’s 
expectations nor satisfy the manager.
The manager’s total compensation depended on 
the base salary, cash incentive plan, and the number 
of fringe benefits he received from the firm. Base 
salaries varied widely among managers, but the 
base salary was not an accurate indication of total 
compensation. Cash bonuses based on the number of 
pigs produced per sow annually were commonly used 
by the firm to share profits with the manager. The 
compensation potential of cash incentive plans 
varied widely because of variation in the threshold 
level, the per-pig payment, and the change in per- 
pig payment. Most firms provided the manager with 
several fringe benefits. Housing and utilities usually 
were provided.
The manager’s knowledge, ability, and effort 
were critical factors in the technical efficiency of 
sow-farrowing firms. Managers frequently engaged 
in several self-improvement or human-capital in­
vestment activities at the expense of the firm. Most 
managers wanted to develop their abilities to 
operate the firm efficiently. There is a wide varia­
tion in formal education and experience of 
managers, but on-the-job training and learning was 
extensive and universal.
The independence of the work, financial com­
pensation, and the knowledge of swine management 
to be acquired from operating the facility were ma­
jor sources of job satisfaction to the managers. The 
lack of days off, the long hours, and the unpleasant 
working environment were the major sources of dis­
satisfaction.
An implicit net return on the investment in a
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sow-farrowing firm is the difference between the 
alternative cost and the price paid by members for 
the pigs received from the firm. Traditional feeder 
pig markets and on-farm production are the two 
most common alternative sources of feeder pigs. 
Simple net returns must be adjusted for pig quality 
and differences in the opportunity cost of labor.
The high quality of the feeder pigs produced and 
the stability of supply of feeder pigs were the two 
most satisfactory elements of the investment. Breed­
ing problems, especially low conception rates, were 
the most unsatisfactory or troublesome elements of 
the investment.
The Experiment Station conducts its programs without 
discrimination as to race, color, sex, or national origin.
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